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Social Capital Determinants and Labor
Market Networks
Brian Asquith
Judith K. Hellerstein
Mark J. Kutzbach
David Neumark

Social capital, networks, and determinants
of social capital


O.E.D. definition of social capital:






We study a measure of local labor market
networks we have developed in past work




“The networks of relationships among people who live
and work in a particular society, enabling that society to
function effectively”
A network is not social capital unless it leads to
productive social outcomes
Local labor market networks, as we measure them, are
productive (e.g., better job matches)

We study what predicts/is associated with our
measure of local labor market networks

Terminology of “social capital”


Structural social capital: association links and activities, whether
in formal organizations or informal associations





Contrasts with behavioral (or cognitive) social capital: perceptions of
support, reciprocity, trust, etc.

Our network measure is a measure of social capital – informal
associational links, and productive
We view the measures we relate to network strength as
potential determinants of social capital – i.e., the productive
outcomes




Semantic issue (?): but guards against us calling “everything” that could
connect people “social capital,” without knowing whether those
connections are productive
E.g., “ethnic homogeneity” per se isn’t social capital, but it can produce
social capital

Research question



Our question: Are hypothesized determinants of
social capital associated with stronger labor market
networks?





Measure of labor market networks developed and
“validated” in our past work, which we interpret as
social capital
Past/new measures of determinants of social capital
with rich data from many sources
Machine learning to examine whether/which
neighborhood social capital determinants are associated
with stronger labor market networks

Methods/analysis


Analysis is cross-sectional, between network measures and
social capital determinants


Not so concerned about reverse causation, but about omitted
variables that drive both




We have comprehensive data and controls, but that doesn’t rule out
other common influences on both

Why machine learning?



Multiplicity of potential social capital measures that could help
explain network variation
Wanted to avoid:



Ex ante selection (unclear anyway)
Searching for significant predictors easiest to rationalize ex post as
social capital measures

Schematic of measurement of networks
(HMN, 2011)
4 workers in green
Census tract

Census tract
of residence

4 workers in green
Census tract

Est. A

Census tract
of est.’s

Est. B

Census tract
of residence

Schematic —”even” (random?) allocation

4 workers in green
Census tract

Census tract
of residence

4 workers in green
Census tract

Est. A

Est. B

Census tract
of est.’s

Census tract
of residence

Schematic —segregation by residential
location => networks
4 workers in green
Census tract

Census tract
of residence

4 workers in green
Census tract

Est. A

Est. B

Census tract
of est.’s

Census tract
of residence

Observed network isolation


Network isolation for worker i in tract c
NIic =

∑I
j ≠i

C

(i, j ) ⋅ I E (i, j )

∑I
j ≠i






E

(i, j )

IC(i, j) = indicator for whether co-worker j of worker i also lives
in the same residential neighborhood as i
IE(i, j) = indicator for whether i and j work in the same
establishment
Sums taken over all workers except i
Measures share of co-workers with whom worker i is coresident

Adjustments needed



Some clustering of neighbors in establishments
occurs randomly, in particular because people tend
to work near where they live


In HMN, we measure this directly, and adjust






Measure clustering relative to “random clustering,” which we
compute by distributing workers in a Census tract randomly to
establishments in that Census tract

Here we control for it in regression

Condition on skill, which we do in earlier work by
doing the random clustering conditional on skill

Other research establishes productivity of
networks



HKN (2014): robust finding that workers hired into jobs with
greater network connections to co-residents have lower
turnover (LEHD 2004-2007)






True in highly-saturated models: e.g., worker characteristics, controls for
“network” of neighbors at nearby employers, employer-year fixed effects,
etc.
Much evidence points to higher wages also, but less robust

HKN (2019): labor market networks coupled with connections to
hiring at neighbors’ employers speed re-employment after mass
layoffs, and at better jobs

Network measures in this paper:
effective network isolation indexes


Network isolation index constructed by averaging NIic over
individuals in same tract, one computed over workers, and one
over people
NI CW





 1 Wc

=  ∑ NIic  ×100
WC i =1


 1 Pc

NI =  ∑ NIic  ×100
 PC i =1

P
C

Possible advantage of NICP: picks up effects on employment
Possible disadvantage is more sensitivity to local labor market conditions

We also construct tract-level analogues as controls – “transport
isolation indexes”


Clustering of neighbors by tract (not establishment), to pick up
transportation infrastructure that could create illusion of clustering by
establishment (parallels correction for random clustering in HMN, 2011)

Data for measuring neighborhood labor
market networks







LEHD: workers (and neighbors) aged 18-64
2010 data, to correspond to other data we use
Home and workplace information for 110 million jobs
at beginning of 2nd quarter (to match LEHD public-use
products), and linked to other information on
workers, past residences, etc.
About 34,000 (urban) tracts

Descriptive statistics: network measures
(and related controls)
Variable
NIcW
TIcW
NIcP
TIcP



Magnitudes





Description
Observed tract average network
isolation index, per worker
Observed tract average transport
isolation index, per worker
Observed tract average network
isolation index, per resident
Observed tract average transport
isolation index, per resident

Mean
1.609

Std. dev.
1.113

0.588

0.612

1.013

0.710

0.373

0.393

NICW = 1.609: on average, 1.6% of co-workers live in same tract
 Maximum is much less than 100%, because of sizes of firms where tract
residents live
TICW = 0.588: on average, 0.6% of those who work in same tract live in same
tract
Implication: clustering of neighbors by establishment is a good deal higher than
what is predicted by location factors alone

Are determinants of social capital in a neighborhood
associated w/ stronger labor market networks?



Social capital determinants guided by previous literature






Demographic features/homogeneity of neighborhoods associated with
trust of others and society more generally (e.g., Alesina and La Ferrara,
2002)
Schools: smaller, higher-income parents, and small classes, which may be
associated with higher parental involvement in schools, interaction with
neighbors, etc. (e.g., Gardner et al., 2000)
Voting






Turnout (civic participation, e.g., Guiso et al., 2004)
Conservative/liberal views: trust in different institutions (e.g., Putnam, 1994)
Homogeneity

New measures of civic institutions, religious organizations, and other nonprofits (Coleman, 1988; Putnam, 2000; Rupasingha et al., 2006)

Social capital determinants from Census
(examples)



Census measures/controls




Share owner-occupied housing; residential mobility
Job access measure (ACS): share commuting < 10 minutes
Share who commute alone (ACS)




Could reflect social capital or geography of jobs

Demographic and other homogeneity: HHI for racial/ethnic
shares; and Gini coefficient for income

School-related social capital determinants


From 2010 school district boundaries (U.S. Census
Bureau School Boundary Map), Census tract maps, and
data from Dept. of Education’s “Common Core”




Average student/teacher ratio (predicted negative effect)
Share on FRPL (predicted negative effect)
Number of districts to which students in tract assigned




Could reduce networking because tracts fragmented, or could
increase it by reflecting small schools with more parental
involvement

First two could also reflect other factors associated with SES,
but especially for NICW, which “conditions” on working, not
clear why this would be correlated with network strength

Voting measures


2008 presidential voting results by 2010 tracts (from
Harvard Election Data Archive)



Fraction of voting age population that voted (predicted
positive effect)
Fraction that voted Democratic




Prediction? Putnam (1994) suggests that conservatives may be more
supportive of local, potentially more private associations that build
structural social capital at the local level, whereas liberals might be
less supportive out of a concern that current inequalities will be
embedded in local social capital.

Fraction of votes for candidate of party winning vote in tract
(homogeneity, predicted positive effect)

New measures of non-profit sector
establishments of many types


2013 NETS







Longitudinal data on universe of establishments in United States, based
on Dun & Bradstreet data
More complete coverage of non-profits than LEHD
Highly-detailed NAICS codes
Detailed geographic information (geocoded or Census block or tract)

Non-profit status not always reported well (50%), and some clear
errors at individual level (e.g., specific churches verified from
their website coded as for-profit)



We use all NAICS 6-digit industries with 10% of non-missing cases coded
as non-profits (85 total)
We use counts of non-profit establishments, by 6-digit sector (chosen by
machine learning)


We add overall count of NETS establishments, so we estimate effect of
composition

Estab’s in non-profit sector can produce social
capital in different ways






Public goods/community functions (e.g., neighborhood
associations; Neighborhood Watch)
Social interactions (e.g., athletic clubs)
Both (Kiwanis culbs)
Evidence from machine learning algorithm can help establish
whether stronger labor market networks are associated with
public goods provisions (“estab’s” that strengthen neighbhood
ties), or social interactions (e.g., country clubs)


But not always easy to distinguish

“Non-profit” social capital examples (I)
NAICS12
NAICS Description (6-digit)
813410 Alumni associations; Alumni clubs; Automobile clubs (except road
and travel services); Book discussion clubs; Booster clubs; Boy
guiding organizations; Civic associations; Classic car clubs; Computer
enthusiasts clubs; Ethnic associations; Farm granges; Fraternal
associations or lodges, social or civic; Fraternal lodges; Fraternal
organizations; Fraternities (except residential); Garden clubs; Girl
guiding organizations; Golden age clubs; Granges; Historical clubs;
Membership associations, civic or social; Parent-teachers'
associations; Poetry clubs; Public speaking improvement clubs;
Retirement associations, social; Scouting organizations; Senior
citizens' associations, social; Singing societies; Social clubs; Social
organizations, civic and fraternal; Sororities (except residential);
Speakers' clubs; Student clubs; Students' associations; Students'
unions; University clubs; Veterans' membership organizations;
Women's auxiliaries; Women's clubs; Writing clubs; Youth civic
clubs; Youth clubs (except recreational only); Youth farming
organizations; Youth scouting organizations; Youth social clubs

Non-Profit
Count
14839

Total
Estab’s
44974

% NonProfit
33.0

“Non-profit” social capital examples (II)

NAICS12
NAICS Description (6-digit)
813110 Bible societies; Churches; Convents (except schools); Missions,
religious organization; Monasteries (except schools); Mosques,
religious; Places of worship; Religious organizations; Retreat houses,
religious; Shrines, religious; Synagogues; Temples, religious
813930 Employees’ associations for improvement of wages and working
conditions; Federation of workers, labor organizations; Federations of
labor; Industrial labor unions; Labor federations; Labor unions (except
apprenticeship programs); Trade unions (except apprenticeship
programs); Trade unions, local; Unions (except apprenticeship
programs), labor
713910 Country clubs; Golf and country clubs; Golf courses (except miniature,
pitch-n-putt)

Non-Profit
Count
73178

Total
Estab’s
228934

% NonProfit
32.0%

2892

11966

24.2%

2682

12361

21.7%

Machine learning to select social
capital “predictors” of networks


Estimation from objective function (Belloni et al., 2014):
n

p

p

c =1

l =1

l =1

βˆ = arg min ∑ ( yc − ∑ xcl bl ) 2 + λ ∑ | bl | γ l
b







Used when researchers don’t have strong priors on which variables
matter, many possible predictors (even more than sample size), and
there is risk of “over-fitting”
“Shrinks” coefficients, with some going to zero, to keep number of
predictors small
First term is OLS objective function
Second term is penalty function





λ overall, and γl applied to each covariate
Values chosen by LASSO algorithm to choose best predictors, based on crossvalidation, which can be thought of incorporating the accuracy of out of sample
prediction into the estimation

Followed by OLS on selected variables (SE’s clustered by county)

OLS and LASSO results (examples/highlights): commuting
and neighborhood variables (full controls and state FE’s)
NIcW
Variables
Commute < 10 minutes
Commute by driving alone
Share did not move
in last year
Share housing
owner-occupied
Population (1,000s)/
sq. mile
Gini coefficient of
household income
Race/ethnicity HerfindahlHirschmann index
Observed tract average
transport isolation index, per worker
Count of NETS estab’s (100s)





OLS
(1)
0.788***
(0.076)
-0.443***
(0.066)
0.321***
(0.066)
0.318***
(0.040)
-0.012***
(0.003)
1.78***
(0.083)
0.235***
(0.043)
1.280***
(0.017)
0.051***
(0.005)

NIcP
LASSO
(2)
0.768†
(0.056)
-0.474†
(0.037)
0.305†
(0.052)
0.324†
(0.027)
-0.012†
(0.001)
1.67†
(0.065)
0.248†
(0.033)
1.27†
(0.007)
0.062†
(0.003)

Driving alone: less networked
Less residential mobility: more networked
Racially/ethnically homogeneous: more networked

OLS
(3)
0.435***
(0.042)
-0.150***
(0.036)
0.208***
(0.039)
0.201***
(0.023)
-0.007***
(0.001)
1.01***
(0.048)
0.191
(0.026)
1.26***
(0.012)
0.030***
(0.003)

LASSO
(4)
0.388†
(0.033)
-0.192†
(0.022)
0.229†
(0.030)
0.199†
(0.016)
-0.006†
(0.0004)
0.954†
(0.039)
0.188†
(0.021)
1.25†
(0.006)
0.042†
(0.002)

OLS and LASSO results: prior social capital variables
(full controls and state FE’s)
NIcW
Variables

Number of districts
Average number of tracts
in school district(s)
Student/teacher ratio
Free/reduced-price
lunch share
Majority vote share
Democratic vote share
Voter turnout



OLS
(1)
0.048***
(0.007)
-0.002
(0.002)
0.0004
(0.002)
-0.034
(0.025)
0.116*
(0.060)
-0.819***
(0.055)
0.0005
(0.021)

NIcP

LASSO with full controls + state FEs
(2)
0.046†
(0.005)
-0.003
(0.002)

-0.746†
(0.037)
0.046†
(0.005)

OLS
(3)
0.029***
(0.005)
-0.0005
(0.001)
-0.002
(0.002)
-0.073***
(0.015)
0.061*
(0.034)
-0.575***
(0.031)
0.013
(0.013)

LASSO with full controls + state FEs
(4)
0.028†
(0.003)

-0.060†
(0.012)
-0.453†
(0.019)
0.028†
(0.003)

Signs of significant estimates mostly consistent with expectations (retained variables
highlighted)




More districts: more networked (suggests smaller districts plays role)
Higher turnout: more networked
Higher Democratic vote share: less networked

LASSO results: non-profit social capital variables
(consistent positive effects on network measures) –
out of 90 NAICS codes in non-profit sector
NAICS
525120
611110
621910
622310
711130
713910
721214
813110
813211
813410

Examples
Union health and welfare funds
Elementary and secondary schools; Junior high schools
Ambulance services, air or ground; Rescue services, medical
Children’s hospitals, specialty
Chamber musical groups
Country clubs; Golf courses (except miniature, pitch-n-putt)
Children’s camps
Churches; Mosques; Synagogues
Charitable trusts; Community foundations
Civic associations; Fraternal organizations; Fraternities (except residential); Parent-teachers’
associations; Scouting organizations
813930
Labor unions
921110
Advisory commissions; City and town managers’ offices; Mayor’s offices
922120
Housing police; Park police; Police departments
922160
Fire and rescue service; Firefighting, government and volunteer
Industries are included in this table if all of the estimated LASSO coefficients across different specifications were
positive, and at least three (out of six) were statistically significant at the 5-percent level.

Results for non-profits (I)


Many seem like natural or even stereotypical types of estab’s
that would foster social capital








Hobby clubs, civic associations, Scouts, PTAs, etc. (NAICS code 813410)
Churches, mosques, etc. (813110)
Fire and rescue services, including volunteer fire departments (922160)
Schools (611110)
Country clubs and golf courses (713910)

Likely to encourage contacts between neighbors, and perhaps
also those who work in similar types of jobs (country clubs,
churches, schools may be segregated by SES)

Results for non-profits (II)


Others may foster social capital, but perhaps not via contacts
among neighbors







Police departments (NAICS code 922120)
City and mayors’ office (NAICS code 921110); could reflect
decentralization
Hospitals (NAICS code 622310)

Not really any with positive effects that don’t seem to fit one
of these interpretations
Some negative effects (same criteria) are hard to interpret
(e.g., social science research and development services (NAICS
code 541720); apprenticeship training programs (NAICS code
611513); homeowners’ associations (NAICS code 813990))


But wouldn’t have expected positive effects, arguably, and estimated
effects much smaller

Magnitudes are sizable, comparable to
traditional social capital determinants



Examples – non-profit sector:





NAICS 813410 (hobby clubs, scouts, PTAs): 1 SD increase in non-profit
sector count increases NIcW by 2.4%
NAICS 813110 (churches, mosques, synagogues): 1 SD increase in nonprofit sector count increases NIcW by 6.7%
NAICS 813410 (country clubs and golf courses): 1 SD change in nonprofit sector count increases NIcW by 2.9%
Comparable or larger than for many of the “traditional” variables in the
social capital literature (especially aggregating across multiple NAICS
codes)

Conclusions




We find surprisingly (?) consistent evidence that social capital measures
are positively associated with measures of the strength of labor market
networks at the Census tract level
True for variables tied to past work/writing on social capital





Smaller, more decentralized, less poor schools
Higher Republican votes share

True for our new measures of non-profit-sector estab’s, which we view as
measuring density of institutions that facilitate social capital, such as







Churches and religious institutions
Schools
Police departments
Country clubs
Labor unions
For many, evidence consistent with non-profits that facilitate social capital in
the form of labor market network connections among neighbors

